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Abstract 
The rise of conglomerate banks and their interrelated balance sheets, pose new challenges 
to theories of financial regulation.  We measure the impact of recent legislative changes 
in Australia upon systemic risk, for banking and near banking sectors, and demonstrate a 
significant reduction post the legislation.   This is consistent with a major legislative goal, 
to promote global competitiveness, because it implies a reduction in the cost of equity 
capital.  In addition, we find no evidence in support of the HIH collapse increasing sys-
temic risk in the overall financial sector but a relatively small effect was detected in the 
banking sector.   
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The Financial Services Reform Act 2001:  
Impact on systemic risk in Australia 
Recent financial regulation in Australia has undergone significant change with the introduc-
tion of the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (“the Act”) that the Minister for Financial 
Services and Regulation described as the “cutting edge of global regulatory reform
1.”   A 
major objective of this Act was to provide a means of enhancing Australia’s international 
competitive position by providing a harmonized regulatory regime which created incentives 
for further growth and development of the modern conglomerate bank
2. 
 
The rise of the modern conglomerate bank raises new concerns about impact upon sys-
temic stability.  For example as observed by Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005) in the 
US:  
“Banking panics are virtually non existent ….. Accordingly, the risk exposures of 
such institutions have become considerably more complex and interdependent, espe-
cially in the face of globalization and the recent wave of consolidations in the bank-
ing and financial services sectors.”    
 
This same observation applies with equal force to Australia.  In this paper, using a new 
methodology, we examine the impact upon systemic stability in Australia from the passing 
of the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (“the Bill”) and the enactment of the Financial 
Services Reform Act (“the Act”) – referred to hereafter as “the legislation” .  We measure 
the impact of the legislation on both the banking and near banking sectors and demon-
strate a clear reduction in systemic risk, and the related concept of entropy (i.e., disorder), 
after the legislation.   
 
This reduction in systemic risk is consistent with a major aim of the legislation, to enhance 
global competitiveness, because it implies that the cost of equity capital has reduced in the 
financial and banking sectors thus providing a natural counterbalance to the fact that finan-
cial regulation is costly.  In particular, the FSA (Financial Services Authority (2002)) in an 
international comparison estimated that the direct costs of regulation in Australia in 2002 
(ignoring compliance) were $A300 million.
3 
                                                 
1 The Hon.Joe Hockey Minister for Financial Services and Regulation Second Reading Speech to the House 
of Representatives April 5, 2001 
2 Section 5.49 Report on the Financial Services Reform Bill.  See also 2.49-2.52 of this same report.  
3 UK Financial Services Authority Annual Report 2002 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the background of and motiva-
tion for recent regulatory initiatives in Australia. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
theory. Section 3 introduces our methodology. Section 4 presents or results. Section 5 ex-
amines the impact of the HIH collapse. Section 6 concludes and provides a discussion in-
cluding directions for future research. 
1.  Background 
The legislation introduced to Australia a “harmonized regulatory regime for market integ-
rity and consumer protection across the financial services industry.
 4” 
 
Financial regulation thinking and implementation has undergone significant change within 
a relative short period of time.  Two leading contenders for regulatory design are Twin ver-
sus Single Peak Models (see Taylor (1995).  For Taylor, the public policy objectives in the 
regulation of financial services are twofold (page 2): 
•  To ensure the stability and soundness of the financial system (“systemic  protec-
tion”) and  
•  To protect individual depositors, investors and policy-holders to the extent that 
they cannot reasonably be expected to protect their own interests (“consumer 
protection”) 
 
Taylor suggested the “Twin Peaks” of a Financial Stability Commission and a Consumer 
Protection Commission. A form of Twin Peaks was implemented in Australia, following 
the recommendations of the Wallis Committee.  As noted by Goodhart, Hartman et al 
(1998),  the Australian implementation of the financial stability peak was actually broader 
including among other things responsibility for disclosure.  In the next section of the pa-
per, we demonstrate that this is an important extension because of linkages that can be de-
duced, from results contained in the theoretical papers, between disclosure and risk.  The 
twin peak model is in sharp contrast to a single “Mega” regulator (e.g. The Financial Ser-
vices Authority in the UK) where both functions (including disclosure) are performed by a 
single regulatory agency (see Dale and Wolfe (2003). 
                                                 
4 Minister for Financial Services and Regulation, the Hon.Joe Hockey Second Reading Speech to the House 
of Representatives April 5, 2001 
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Taylor also advocates a wider scope for prudential supervision than just banks. Similarly, 
under the Wallis Committee recommendations, adopted by the Australian Government, 
the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (“APRA”) is the main regulator for not only 
banks but also building societies, credit unions, life insurance companies, superannuation 
and approved deposit funds, friendly societies and general insurance companies.   The Aus-
tralian  Securities  and  Investment  Commission  (“ASIC”)  is  the  regulator  of  conduct  of 
business and disclosure for all sectors and the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) is re-
sponsible for monetary policy, monitoring systemic stability and overseeing the payments 
system.  Therefore, regulatory responsibility for banks is split from the central bank which 
serves to further promote the development of the modern conglomerate bank by harmo-
nizing the regulatory regime.   In particular, the report on the Financial Services Reform 
Bill (sections 2.42, 2.43) document the Committee’s response to concerns by the Com-
monwealth Bank and the Australian Bankers’ Association that the Bill was not going far 
enough to recognize this, and the Government accepted this by making the appropriate 
amendments. 
 
In the next section we review the economic theory to identify the drivers of systemic risk.  
2. Theory  
Traditionally systemic risk is defined in terms of one bank’s failure causing other banks to 
fail.  One bank’s failure can transmit shocks to other and otherwise solvent banks causing 
them to fail.  The traditional reason for this arises from the inherent instability given the 
borrowing short lending long nature of banking business.  For example, in the seminal 
study of bank run phenomena Diamond and Dybvig (1983), information asymmetries were 
introduced directly into the liquidity demands of consumers.  Agents in the economy were 
assumed to face a privately observed and uninsurable risk of being either an early or late 
consumer.  This work then identified the equilibrium properties of a demand deposit con-
tract designed to provide insurance against an agent having to consume early.  Interestingly, 
the demand deposit solution was susceptible to a run (a second and inferior Nash equilib-
rium) where all agents prefer to withdraw in the first period because the face value is larger 
than the liquidation value in the second period.  This result is often referred to as the “sun-
spot view,” because in the equilibrium expectations are self fulfilling but unpredictable be-
cause occurrence is unrelated to events in the real economy. 
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However,  the  sunspot  interpretation  has  not  received  support  from  empirical  studies 
Gorton (1988)).  This study concluded that bank runs are linked to the real economy, in 
this case the business cycle.  As a result, attention shifted to linking panics or runs in 
equilibrium to the realization of some threshold value of a variable relevant to predicting 
the riskiness of deposits.  For example, Jaklin and Bhattacharya (1988) analyzed examples 
that introduce a two sided asymmetric information problem (liquidity type and a signal of 
future returns), such that a subset of the bank client’s make inferences about the quality of 
the bank’s asset.  This permits the distinction to be made between information-based runs 
and pure panic based runs of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) nature.  In an information 
based run declining asset quality interacting with liquidity needs, can precipitate a crises.  
Similarly, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) modelled information based runs by introducing 
information asymmetry for a subset of consumers about future returns being low.  This left 
the residual proportion of depositors with a signal extraction problem when forming ex-
pectations rationally.  As a result, based upon observed withdrawal behaviour, bank runs 
could now even occur when adverse information is absent, because the bank’s assets are 
illiquid and a negative realization of withdrawals adversely influences the inference prob-
lem.   Allen and Gale (1998) also linked runs to information that bank assets are going to 
be unusually low as is induced in a business cycle, and demonstrated that a positive role 
emerges for a central bank to stabilize prices, because otherwise if the bank’s risky asset can 
be liquidated a deadweight loss is incurred when prices are forced down in times of crisis. 
 
The above review reflects an increasing trend in the literature of emphasis being shifted 
from the traditional view of bank runs to asset quality and liquidity issues.  In fact today 
significant interdependencies exist among banks’ balance sheets resulting from modern risk 
management practice that is designed to eliminate the inherent instability within banking 
practice.  From a regulatory perspective this implies that attention must shift from the tra-
ditional focus of preventing bank runs to monitoring the system at a macro level to ensure 
that risk management controls being applied at the micro level are effective.  This has led 
to the interesting paradox that with modern regulatory controls banking panics are virtually 
non existent in the US but the rise of the modern conglomerate bank in response to the 
globalization has made the financial market risk exposure of such institutions considerably 
more  complex  and  interdependent  than  ever  before  Chan,  Getmansky,  Haas  and  Lo 
(2005).   
 
These observations apply with equal force to the banking sector in Australia.  For example, 
in the report on the Financial Services Reform Bill of 2001 Parliamentary Joint Statutory ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Committee on Corporations and Securities (2001) the Committee was careful to acknowl-
edge sensitivity to concerns expressed by the Commonwealth Bank and the Australian 
Bankers’ Association that the Bill initially failed to recognized that the typical Australian 
financial corporate structure was a conglomerate (section 2.42).  As a result, incentives were 
implemented to promote this trend towards modern conglomerate banking in Australia. 
 
The developments reviewed above lead to a broader view of systemic risk that shifts atten-
tion to the asset side of the balance sheet, and places increased attention upon the impor-
tance of both risk management controls (i.e., prudential regulation) and market integrity 
(i.e., conduct of business regulation).  The latter is important because one immediate impli-
cation from stronger conduct of business regulation is increased levels of mandated disclo-
sure to the capital markets.   It is well known from the existing analytical literature that 
shifting  from  one  information  system  to  another  information  system  will  have  re-
distributive effects (Demski (1973), Demski (1974), Kanodia (1980)). That is, in markets 
that are relatively efficient with increased levels of mandated disclosure may not result in 
desirable consequences from a regulator’s point of view. 
   
To understand the reasons identified in the literature for this, we first consider disclosure in 
an unregulated voluntary market.  Early insights from the voluntary disclosure literature 
raised  serious  questions  whether  mandating  disclosure  could  have  any  additional  affect 
upon the information set available to agents in the economy.  These papers observed that if 
it is costless to disclose truthfully a fully separating equilibrium results (Grossman and Hart 
(1980, Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)).   Full separation is induced by investors who 
keep revising downwards their expectations about the quality of non disclosers which in 
turn induces additional disclosure until there is nothing left to disclose.  Full separation, 
however, is inconsistent with historical observations.  For example, in the US prior to the 
1933/34 Securities’ Acts, some firms disclosed voluntarily information that subsequently 
became mandated under the regulation whereas others chose not to disclose this informa-
tion voluntarily.  In other words evidence of a disclosure threshold exists.   
 
In the analytical literature, it has been established that if it is costly to disclose information 
then a disclosure threshold results at the point where the marginal benefit from not disclos-
ing equals the marginal cost from disclosing (Grossman and Hart (1980), Jovanovic (1982), 
Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia (1990)).  The threshold point separates two types of equilib-
rium, pooling versus separating.  Important drivers of shifts in the threshold point have 
been  identified  in  the  subsequent  voluntary  disclosure  literature  which  falls  into  two ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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strands: exogenous disclosure costs (Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia (1990)) and endogenous 
disclosure costs (Dye (1985), Dye (1986), Jung and Kwon (1988)). 
 
Central to conduct of business regulation is the objective of increasing market integrity.  So 
we consider first Corollary 2 Verrecchia (1990) applied in relation to common interpreta-
tions of market integrity.  Corollary 2 establishes that an increase in the precision of inves-
tors’ prior beliefs market shifts the voluntary disclosure threshold to the right.  The ASX 
defines  market  integrity  as  “a  market  that  is  fair,  orderly  and  transparent
5.”      Similar, 
Goodhart, Hartmann et al (1998) describe market integrity in terms of being “transparent, 
orderly and efficient”.  As a result, Corollary 2 links increasing market transparency to right 
shifts in the disclosure threshold.  Similarly, Proposition 2 Jung and Kwon (1988) identifies 
that as the probability increases that the manager privately observes the firm value,  the 
threshold shifts to the left.   This proposition is similar to Verrecchia (1990) corollary 1 
which also predicts that the disclosure threshold shifts to the left as the precision of the 
manager’s private information increases.  However, again increased transparency makes it 
less likely that an inside manager is privately informed and so the implication again is for a 
shift to the right of the disclosure threshold if market integrity is enhanced by regulation. 
 
However, one limitation with the above results is that they are single firm results in a pure 
exchange economy.  The redistributive effects identified by Demski (1973), (1974) and Ka-
nodia (1980) arise because of externalities.  For example, in the context of a regulation 
problem Dye (1990) finds the regulator’s mandated disclosure problem is to choose the 
optimal disclosure policy to maximize social welfare for the economy exploiting any exter-
nalities defined in terms of interdependencies (i.e., correlations).  In this model the regula-
tor  attempts  to  exploit  externalities  to  increase  social  welfare  taking  into  account  re-
distributive effects.  In contrast the entrepreneur’s voluntary disclosure problem results in 
an optimal disclosure policy for a firm motivated purely by self interest. In this setting 
mixed results were obtained for the benefits of mandated vis-à-vis voluntary disclosure.  
Recently Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) reached similar conclusions when analyzing man-
dated versus voluntary disclosure in a game theoretic setting for a sector.   However, they 
did identify the interesting result in their model that mandated disclosure is likely to have 
its greatest impact upon social welfare when correlations among the firms in the sector are 
higher.   This finding is suggestive that increased levels of disclosure regulation when tar-
                                                 
5 http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/integrity/ ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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geted towards the financial sector, which has exhibited increasing levels of interdependen-
cies among balance sheets, may be beneficial from a social welfare perspective.   
 
The recent regulatory trend has been very consistent with the evolving concept of systemic 
risk described earlier in the literature reviewed in this section.  Systemic risk attention has 
shifted from placing significant importance upon monitoring financial fragility to that of 
monitoring the effects of return correlations that arise from the growing interdependencies 
among the asset side of the bank’s balance sheets.  From this perspective both prudential 
and conduct of business regulation are important drivers of systemic risk from a control 
perspective.  The latter, because a major objective of a conduct of business regulator is to 
increase market integrity which has important implications for the cost of equity capital of 
a sector by reducing the information risk component (Easley and O'Hara (2004)).  In the 
disclosure theory developed above, the links among market integrity, shifts in the disclo-
sure threshold and risk, also have immediate implications for systemic risk and cost of capi-
tal when applied to the banking sector.  However, ultimately these are empirical questions 
which are addressed in this current paper immediately following the next section.   But first 
in the next section we discuss the linkages from an equivalent and measurable perspective 
which is systemic risk and entropy. 
 
Regulation and Measurable Entropy Reduction Implications 
Entropy originated in the field of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics to provide a 
measure of disorder.  It has subsequently been applied in many settings, including as a non 
parametric measure of risk (Philippatos and Wilson (1972), Philippatos and Wilson (1974)). 
The  concept  of  entropy  is  not  always  relevant  to  economics  as  noted  by  past  papers 
(e.g.,Horowitz and Horowitz (1976)).  One reason why is that entropy is independent of 
the first moment of a distribution and thus renders the concept relatively useless when ap-
plied to valuation or any problem requiring the first moment.  On the other hand the prin-
ciple of maximum entropy has been successfully applied to the formalization of the effi-
cient markets hypothesis (e.g., Cozzolino and Zahner (1973)) and to derivative valuation 
problems (e.g., (Foster and Stutzer (2003), Foster and Whiteman (2004), Stutzer (1996), 
Stutzer (2000)). 
 
From a regulatory perspective the entropy measurement has appealing normative proper-
ties, as identified by Lindsay (1957) and Seifert (1961).  For example, Lindsay argued that 
social organizations should conduct themselves to create the “maximum amount of order 
within their spheres of conduct.”  This idea is applicable to systemic risk regulation because ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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attaining order within the financial or banking sector is equivalent to achieving systemic 
stability.   Therefore an alternative way of assessing the economic effects of the Financial 
Services Reform Bill and Act on the finance and banking sectors is to measure changes in 
entropy.  In particular, we are interested in the change in entropy associated with the shifts 
in the risk neutralized return distributions when moving from one year prior, through to 1-, 
2-, and 3-years after the event date.  Empirically this could either be entropy reducing (i.e., 
reducing disorder) or entropy increasing (increasing disorder).   
 
Although economic applications of entropy are limited e.g. Section 2 Gulko (1999) in our 
current application we exploit a measurable implication from a change in the investors’ expecta-
tions by measuring the change in entropy.  The analytical reasoning underlying this relation 
is deduced from the results of Jung and Kwon (1988), Philippatos and Gressis (1975) and 
Porter and Gaumitz (1972). 
 
First, Jung and Kwon establish that shifts in investors’ rational expectations that result in 
right  shifts  of  the  voluntary  disclosure  threshold imply  SSD.    Second,  Philippatos  and 
Gressis establish that entropy, second order stochastic dominance and mean-variance effi-
ciency are all equivalent when returns are normally distributed.  Entropy, however is more 
general than mean variance efficiency because of the distribution free nature of this con-
cept.   Third, Porter and Gaumitz (1972) demonstrate there is a close relationship between 
SSD and entropy efficient sets, which are almost equivalent. 
 
Combined,  the  above  imply  that  reductions  in  entropy  and  SSD  are  associated  with 
changes in the investors’ expectations that cause the disclosure threshold to shift to the 
right.  From a risk perspective this also implies a reduction in risk for distributions that sat-
isfy the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) mean preserving spread condition
6.   In the next sec-
tion we describe our methodology that is designed to test our central questions and exploit 
these implied relationships.  
                                                 
6 Definition:  A random variable y is riskier than a random variable x if there is a random variable ε such that 
y = x + ε and E(ε|x) = 0 for all x.  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) establish that if F is the distribution associ-
ated with x, and G is associated with y, then G satisfies a mean preserving spread condition relative to F and F 
stochastically dominates G in the second degree.  That is, the first moments are equal but G has greater 
spread.  In addition, for any distribution a mean preserving increasing spread from one distribution to an-
other implies a single-crossing property must be satisfied.  That is, they cross once at their mean (which is 
equal for each distribution).   
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3. Methodology 
The methodology described in this section is designed to measure changes in systemic 
stability by measuring the impact of the regulatory event upon the higher (i.e., second and 
higher) moments of the return distributions for the banking and the financial sectors.  Un-
der the assumption that markets are arbitrage free (i.e., weak form efficient) we estimate the 
risk neutralized return distribution using expected utility method (Luenberger (1998), see 
appendix A for technical details).  The risk neutralized distribution retains important higher 
value relevant moment information (i.e., greater than the first), that is sensitive to shifts in 
systemic risk.  In particular, we estimate the risk neutralized return distribution for the sec-
tor (i.e., Banking or Financial) for a sequence of 1-year time periods from T-1 (1-year prior 
to passing the Bill through to T, T+1, T+2 (1-year, 2-year and 3-year post the passing of 
the Bill).  We examine the behaviour of these distributions over time by applying three 
metrics designed to be sensitive to changes in systemic risk.  These are, annualized volatility 
of the return generating process, second order stochastic dominance and entropy.  Condi-
tions under which these three metrics are equivalent are summarized later in this section. 
 
Properties Preserved by the Methodology 
The methodology is designed to preserve two important properties when adopting a mar-
ket based approach to measuring systemic stability: 
1.  Sensitivity to shifts in systemic (correlations within the banking or financial industry) 
as opposed to systematic risk (correlations with a general economy wide factor).  This 
captures sensitivity to correlations among balance sheet values of the banks (Acharya 
(2001), Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005), Maksimovic (1991)) 
2.  Sensitivity to infrequent events Das and Uppal (2001) 
 
For property 1, we examine the impact of the regulatory reforms upon industry as opposed 
to economy wide returns.  In particular, the log optimal financial sector returns (described 
in Appendix A) are computed after controlling for general market movements.  That is, 
risk neutral distribution is constructed from a position with a zero loading (i.e., beta) with 
respect to general market movements, using the All Ordinaries as the proxy.  That is, we 
make a distinction between systematic risk in the sense of general non diversifiable risk ver-
sus systemic risk measured relative to financial and banking sectors respectively.  
 
Property 2 impacts the tail behavior of a return distribution and is relevant to stress testing 
in a standard risk management system.  The methodology we employ (see Appendix A) to ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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estimate the risk neutralized distribution is designed to measure shifts in systemic risk with-
out imposing distributional assumptions upon the return generating process.  In this manner we 
preserve information in the tails.   
 
Finally, we employ three metrics to estimate shifts in systemic risk.  These are the volatility 
of the return generating process, second order stochastic dominance, and entropy.   
 
Detecting Shifts in the Return Generating Process:   
Consider the risk neutralized price process for the banking and investment sectors both 
before and after an event of interest.  Suppose the process is governed by an Ito Process 
and the volatility function shifts from pre versus post an event.  We consider three metrics 
designed to measure this shift: 
dW t P rdt P DP e ) , ( / Pr σ + =               (1) 
dW t P rdt P DP Post ) , ( / σ + =               (2) 
 
In the above equations P is the sector index, r is risk neutralized drift and σPre(P,t) is the 
volatility function pre the event and similarly for post.  Finally, W for t > 0 W(t) is a stan-
dard normally distributed random variable mean 0, variance t.   The following metrics can 
be used to rank risk neutral distributions associated with the above pair of processes from 
the perspective of a risk averse regulator: 
 
i. Volatility Metric 
In the well known Black and Scholes (1973) model if the volatility function equals a con-
stant then distribution of prices is lognormal and distribution of returns is normal with 
equal means.  For this case a risk averse regulator will prefer the return distribution with 
the smaller volatility. For more general volatility functions then higher order moments need 
to be considered which we consider next.  
 
ii.  Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SSD):  Definition  
A random variable with a distribution F, SSD another random variable with a distribution 
G if: ∫ ≥ −
x
a
b a x all for dt t F t G ] , [ 0 )] ( ) ( [ ε  
SSD is a more general metric that can be applied to rank distributions as defined above.  
For the case of distributions with equal means Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) defined a no-
tion of risk in terms of a mean preserving spread transformation.  Under this transforma-ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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tion distribution G is constructed from F by moving mass from the center to the tails (i.e., 
increasing the spread) without changing the mean.  In this case the following properties are 
implied:  G is riskier than F, the two distributions have a single crossing point and F domi-
nates G under the SSD criteria.  As a result, if F and G refers to banking (or financial sec-
tor) risk pre and post some event then risk averse regulators will prefer F to G when F SSD 
G. Finally, a third metric is a measure of disorder, entropy. 
 
iii.  Entropy: 





− ≡ dx x p x p g H ) ( )] ( ln[ ) (  
for some random variable x.  Philippatos and Gressis (1975) establish that for this third 
measure (iii.) is equivalent to i. and ii. for normal and uniform distributions whereas SSD is 
optimal for lognormal.  They note, however, that given the empirical similarities between ii. 
and iii. (e.g., Porter and Gaumitz (1972)) plus the distribution free nature of iii., then iii. 
becomes appealing.   
 
From these statistical results the economic meaning can be given to shifts in entropy.  That 
is, shifts in investors’ rational expectations that in turn bring about shifts in the disclosure 
threshold (by applying Proposition 3, Jung and Kwon (1988))
7 result in shifts in entropy.  
Therefore, shifts in the risk neutralized distributions again can be ranked in terms of sys-
temic stability by risk averse regulators/investors using the entropy criteria. 
4. Results 
In this section we present the results of our analysis of systemic stability in Australia pre 
versus post the passage of the legislation.  We use three related metrics to measure trends 
in systemic stability by focusing upon both the Financial and Banking Sectors separately 
controlling for general market movements. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This result was derived in Dye’s endogenous disclosure cost economy but it is also equally applicable to the 
proof of Verrecchia’s Corollary 2 (1990)) for the exogenous disclosure cost economy.  Furthermore, the com-
parative static results from Verrecchia’s exogenous disclosure cost economy have recently been extended to 
generalized distributional forms by Jorgensen, Bjorn N., and Hakan Orbay, 2003, A Note on Discretionary 
Disclosure Models. Unpublished Paper, Accounting and Control Area, Harvard Business School, Soldiers 
Field, Boston, MA 02163, Graduate School of Management, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey..    ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Risk Neutral Sector Return Distributions:  Statistical Properties 
We estimate the risk neutralized distribution for each sector for times T-1 (1-year prior to 
passing the Bill), T (1-year after), T+1 (2
nd year after), T+2 (3
rd year after).  Luenberger’s 
expected utility approach was applied, as described in Appendix A, by conducting a Monte 
Carlo simulation using Monte Carlo simulation (e.g., Winston (1999)).    
 
The results of this analysis are provided in Table 1.  We conduct three statistical tests on 
the risk neutral return distributions using maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs)
8.  The 
results indicate that in each case there is evidence of departures from normality in each of 
the time periods.   
Table 1: Tests of Normality for Return Distributions 
Sector:    AXFJ  Tests of Normality for Return Distribution 
  Annual. Volatility  Chi-Sq  Probability  A-D  Probability  K-S  Probability 
T-1  0.0859  174.8  0.7292  0.6703  0.05 <= p<= 0.1  0.0027  0.05 <= p <= 0.1 
T  0.07746  194.021  0.3472  0.3854  > 0.25  0.0018  > 0.15 
T+1  0.06329  220.991  0.045  1.6519  < 0.005  0.0039  < 0.01 
T+2  0.05269  224.184  0.0327  0.67  0.05 <= p<= 0.1  0.0023  > 0.15 
Sector:  AXBAJ  Tests of Normality for Return Distribution 
  Annual.Volatility  Chi-Sq  Probability  A-D  Probability  K-S  Probability 
T-1  0.124005395  178.9  0.6524  1.278  < 0.005  0.0033  < 0.01 
T  0.119296842  216.1  0.0714  1.43  < 0.005  0.0035  < 0.01 
T+1  0.099721661  197.8  0.2804  0.6178  0.1 <= p<= 0.15  0.0025  0.1 <= p <= 0.15 
T+2  0.085389608  206.895  0.1518  1.4219  < 0.005  0.0031  0.025<= p<= 0.05 
 
The results in Table 1 support using the second order stochastic dominance and entropy 
metrics for measuring changes in systemic stability over the volatility of return generating 
process.  However, in the next sections the results from each of the three metrics (annual-
ized volatility of the return generating process, second order stochastic dominance, and 
entropy) are provided. 
 
                                                 
8 The tests conducted, using the @Risk software package, are the Chi-Squared (χ2) statistic, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) statistic, and the Anderson-Darling (A-D) statistic.  Each of the above tests has its strengths 
and weaknesses.  For example, there are no clear guidelines for χ2 when selecting the number and location of 
the “bins.”  In our tests, we adjusted the bin sizes based on the fitted distribution to make each bin contain an 
equal amount of probability.  An advantage of both the K-S and A-D tests is that they do not require the 
exogenous specification of some set of bins, however, the K-S statistic is less sensitive to tail deviations than 
is the A-D test.  So from a systemic risk perspective the A-D statistic is of particular interest given its greater 
sensitivity to tail differences, whereas both the Chi Square and K-S tests provide reasonable tests of normality 
in general.   ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Risk Neutralized Return Distributions:  Analysis of Threshold Shifts 
In this section we exploit the analytical result (reviewed in the theory section) that relates 
shifts in the disclosure threshold to stochastic dominance.  To conduct this analysis we first 
normalize the estimated risk neutralized distributions by equating the means to the average 
risk free rate over the combined period.  This is without loss of generality given that the 
first moment drops out of the risk neutralized distribution.  We then construct tests for 
shifts in the voluntary disclosure threshold by testing for (a) variance ratio test for volatility 
shifts, and (b) second order stochastic dominance over time and which must satisfy the 
single crossing condition identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).  A Chi-Squared test is 
used to indicate the relative size of the shift of the normalized distributions.  We report the 
entropy analysis separately in a later section. 
Analysis of the Financial and Banking Sectors 
In the following results section we provide the graph of how the risk neutralized distribu-
tion shifted over time from a second order stochastic dominance perspective.  Below each 
graph we present both the results from a variance ratio test (i.e., analysis of the second 
moment ignoring higher moments) and a Chi Square test conducted on the distribution 
(i.e., analysis of all moments greater than the first).  Four periods of time are considered:  
one year prior to August 23, 2001, and 1-, 2- and 3-years after correspond to T-1, T, T+1, 
T+2 as labeled.  For comparison purposes each graph is provided with its domain scaled to 
equal the mean plus/minus two times the average volatility.   
 
We provide the results supporting this analysis in table 2.  In the graphs presented below 
we indicate the dominance relationship as “>” implying the shift is to the right for the 
threshold (and therefore to the right in the region below the single crossing point and to 
the left above the single crossing point).  The Chi-Square statistic is computed to test the 
Hypothesis of no shift in the distribution from T versus T-1
9.  All Chi-Square statistics are 
highly significant. 
 
The financial sector exhibits a clear trend of dominance as we move from pre to post Au-
gust 23, 2001 and thereafter.  The shift is monotonic each year.   
                                                 
9 The Chi-Square test is applied as follows.  First, 100 bins were defined relative to the pre-event distribution 
using the numerically estimated moments.  This defined the expected frequencies under the null hypothesis.  
The observed frequencies (for the same set of bins) from the post event distribution defined the observed 
frequencies.  A standard chi square statistic is then computed to test the null hypothesis of no difference pre 
versus post distributions. 
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Figure 1: Financial Services Reform Act 2001  - 1-year Pre versus 1-, 2- and 3-years Post Cumulative 




Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T < T+1 < T+2.  
Chi-Square Statistics (1786.22, 6016.40, 5049.01 (T vs. T-1, T+1 vs. T, T+2 vs. T+1 ). 
Chi-Square Statistic T+2 vs. T-1 = 27962.76 As a result, the total shift is very large and 
highly significant. 
 
To interpret the above graph it is noted that second order stochastic dominance implies 
that the probability mass shifts from below the single cross point to above the single cross-
ing point.  So above the single crossing point T-1 is the lowest graph through to T+2 being 
the top graph as indicated by the arrow.  This order is reversed if viewing from below the 
single crossing point.    
 
By applying the Rothschild and Stiglitz definition of risk presented in the Theory section
10  
we conclude that systemic stability has increased when moving from T-1 to T+2 and the 
effect has been extremely pronounced!  
                                                 
10 Definition:  A random variable y is riskier than a random variable x if there is a random variable ε such 
that y = x + ε and E(ε|x) = 0 for all x.   
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Results from Variance Ratio Tests are shown below: 
 
Variance Ratio Tests - AXFJ  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
Sample Size  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000 
Sample Mean  0.051928553  0.052278558  0.048390638  0.052317563 
Sample Variance  0.007424441  0.006020591  0.003980644  0.002775118 
Null Hypothesis    T = T-1  T+1 = T  T+2 = T+1 
F    1.233174949  1.512466657  1.434405253 
P(F<=f) one-tail    4.027E-150  0  0 
F Critical one-tail    1.018861868  1.018861868  1.018861868 
Accept/Reject Null @ 1% sign.    Reject  Reject  Reject 
 
  Similar results were obtained for the Banking Sector.  These are depicted next. 
Figure 2: Financial Services Reform Act 2001  - 1-year Pre versus 1-, 2- and 3-years Post Cumulative 
Return Distribution for AXBAJ Index 
 
 
Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T < T+1 < T+2.  
Chi-Square Statistics (272.44,4853.67, 3681.96 (T vs. T-1, T+1 vs. T, T+2 vs. T+1 ). 
Chi-Square Statistic T+2 vs. T-1 = 17555.78 
 
Again the total shift is very large, strictly monotonic in the positive direction (increasing 
stochastic dominance) and highly significant although a little weaker than the Financial Sec-ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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tor.  We explore some reasons for this latter observation in the section below titled Conta-
gion from HIH. Results from Variance Ratio Tests are shown below: 
 
Variance Ratio Tests - AXBAJ  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
Sample Mean  0.047912346  0.045022477  0.04567078  0.058267825 
Sample Size  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000 
Sample Variance  0.015437695  0.014196489  0.009975185  0.007273954 
Null Hypothesis    T = T-1  T+1 = T  T+1 = T-2 
F    1.08743047  1.423180539  1.371356725 
P(F<=f) one-tail    8.72064E-26  0  0 
F Critical one-tail    1.018861868  1.018861868  1.018861868 




In the theory section we discussed the reasons underlying the assumption that a general 
objective of systemic risk regulation is to reduce entropy in the financial and/or banking 
sector (i.e., reduce the potential for chaos to order).  The implications are identical to the 
results presented in the previous section on stochastic dominance if the risk neutralized 
return distributions are normally distributed, but the results can vary when this assumption 
is violated.  As a result, our entropy analysis provides an alternative metric to test the ro-
bustness of the findings presented in this result section. We estimated the entropy associ-
ated with each risk neutralized distribution of returns
11.  In each T-1, T, T+1, T+2 case 
both the interval of time and the range of returns was held constant when estimating en-
tropy for comparison purposes.  Again, and consistent with the threshold analysis pre-
sented in the previous section on second order stochastic dominance (which is consistent 
with implications from Porter and Gaumnitz (1972) and Philippatos and Gressis (1975), 
entropy is decreasing monotonically over the sequence of time periods.  The results of this 
are provided in Table III, for both Banking and the Financial sectors.  Again the same 
monotonic decrease is observed in entropy for both sectors with the evidence supporting a 
greater decrease in the Financial Sector than observed in the Banking Sector.   
                                                 





i i p p p H
1
log ) ( .  For each sector one thou-
sand buckets were applied to the range computed from T-1 to T+2 years.  That is, the buckets were kept 
common across years so that the entropy numbers are comparable across years for each sector.  In each case 
we checked that our Monte Carlo Simulation and the number of buckets used was of sufficient size to satisfy 
the property that entropy was independent of the mean and which is the case beyond the 4th decimal place. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Table 2: Entropy Analysis of Risk Neutral Distributions 
Sector AXFJ  Label  Entropy 
Aug 2000-01  T-1  8.8493 
Aug 2001-02  T  8.6861 
Aug 20002-03  T+1  8.3956 
Aug2003-04  T+2  8.1337 
Sector AXBAJ     
Aug 2000-01  T-1  8.8365 
Aug 2001-02  T  8.7804 
Aug 20002-03  T+1  8.5230 
Aug2003-04  T+2  8.3021 
 
Combined results in this section provide some support for arguments that the Banking 
Sector requires specific treatment relative to the financial sector in general.  However, there 
is no evidence that providing regulatory incentives to promote the evolution of the con-
glomerate bank structure in Australia has adversely affected systemic stability.   To the con-
trary, the new financial regulatory model has had a positive impact.  An important eco-
nomic consequence of this is that it implies that the cost of capital for banks has reduced 
quite dramatically which is entirely consistent with a stated goal of the regulation which was 
to enhance the global competitiveness of the financial sector in Australia. 
5. Contagion from HIH 
It has not escaped our attention that during the 1-year preceding the passing of the Bill 
Australia’s largest insurance failure (HIH Holdings) occurred.  As a result, it is possible that 
the T-1 results are contaminated by this failure to the extent that it had contagion implica-
tions. In fact, subsequent to the collapse there was a significant influence upon the imple-
mentation of financial regulation in Australia.  The recommendations of the subsequent 
Royal commission inquiry into the collapse resulted in some of the original recommenda-
tions from the Wallis report being overturned and the respective roles of the RBA, APRA 
and ASIC being further refined.  Among these refinements were: 
“I recommend that the direct involvement of representatives of the Australian Secu-
rities and Investments Commission and the Reserve Bank of Australia in the govern-
ance of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority be discontinued.” 
 
In addition, in section 8.2.1 of the final report it was stated that: 
“A key reason used to justify prudential regulation of banking is the threat of conta-
gion and systemic risk.  ………….Contagion is less relevant in the insurance indus-
try.” ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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On the other hand the Commission did acknowledge the possibility: 
“The failure of HIH did, however, impose significant costs on other sectors. For ex-
ample, the building industry was seriously affected when HIH collapsed as builders 
found it difficult to find warranty insurance cover for projects in some states. ……. 
Nevertheless, the possibility that the collapse of an insurer may lead to costs in other 
sectors of the economy is a justification for prudential regulation, particularly given 
the increasing dominance of the Australian market by a few large insurers.” 
 
As a result, we check whether the collapse of HIH impacts the observed trends identified 
in this results section by breaking up T-1 into two sub-periods --- prior and post March 15, 
2001.  The results are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Impact from HIH collapse 
Impact from HIH Collapse   
Sector:    AXFJ  Tests of Normality for Return Distribution   
T-1  Ann. Volatility  Chi-Sq  Probability  A-D  Probability  K-S  Probability  ChiSq Shift 
<March15  0.08797  226.4  0.026  2.461  < 0.005  0.00425  < 0.01  2.1453273 
>March15  0.08826  176.4242  0.6995  0.6321  0.05<= p <= 0.1  0.0029  0.025<=p<=0.05   
T-1 Whole  0.0859  174.7998  0.7292  0.6703  0.05<= p <= 0.1  0.0027  0.05<= p <= 0.1   
Sector:  AXBAJ  Tests of Normality for Return Distribution   
  Ann.Volatility  Chi-Sq  Probability  A-D  Probability  K-S  Probability  ChiSq Shift 
<March15  0.12197  196.2  0.3077  1.894  < 0.005  0.00319  0.01<=p<= .025  791.08243 
>March15  0.12963  254.5  0.000752  3.882  < 0.005  0.0051  < 0.01   
T-1 Whole  0.12400539  178.9  0.6524  1.278  < 0.005  0.00334  < 0.01   
 
It is clear that there was no impact from HIH on the financial sector (the Chi- Square for 
the difference between the two distributions = 2.14).  However there is some evidence for 
a small amount of contagion in the Banking sector (Chi Square for the distribution differ-
ence was 791.08 and the annualized volatility of the return generating process respectively 
for pre and post the collapse respectively are 0.1219 and 0.1296.  However, it is also clear 
that relative to impact of the Financial Services Reform Bill that this contagion impact 
upon banking is small which is consistent with the stance adopted by the Royal commis-
sion.  We conclude that it is of a strictly second order importance with respect to the pri-
mary question being addressed in this paper.  That is, it does not account for the observed 
positive trends in systemic risk shifts that we document in this section. 
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6. Conclusions 
The rise of the modern conglomerate financial institution has posed significant new chal-
lenges to regulators, among which has been the shift from sole importance placed upon 
monitoring financial fragility to that of monitoring the effects from the growing interde-
pendencies among the balance sheets of financial institutions.  Risk exposures implications 
created from this trend have become increasingly complex and blurred.  As a result, in the 
modern approach to the regulation of the financial sector this problem has led to the sepa-
ration of traditional regulation responsibilities for banking by the central bank, in lieu of a 
harmonized regulatory regime.  In turn, the harmonized regulatory regime is designed to 
not only attain cost efficiencies but also promote the further growth of the financial con-
glomerate.   
 
Thus, the question arises as to whether any observable trends have resulted from such de-
velopments.  In particular a desirable trend, consistent with the goals of the regulatory re-
form, is one of enhancing the global competitiveness of the financial sector by reducing 
systemic risk and therefore cost of equity capital.  Alternatively, an undesirable trend is one 
where systemic risk increases from the growing interdependencies among financial firms’ 
balances sheets.  In this paper we examined this question in relation to the event the pass-
ing the Financial Services Reform Bill (2001) and subsequent enactment of the Financial 
Services Reform Act 2001 in Australia. 
 
We obtained positive results. The effects from promoting the further growth of the con-
glomerate financial institution have indeed been positive.  We find no evidence for in-
creases in systemic risk for years 1, 2, and 3 after the passing of the Act.  To the contrary 
we document a highly significant trend of reducing systemic risk commencing from 1-year 
prior to the passing of the Act
12.  In addition, we found no evidence in support of the HIH 
collapse increasing systemic risk in the financial sector but a relatively small effect was de-
tected in the banking sector.  This affect, however, was of second order magnitude com-
pared to the primary trend of systemic risk reduction in both sectors.  Future research, 
however, will examine the contagion effects detected from HIH (an insurance company) 
more closely because of the relevance of this to important assumptions that underlie mod-
ern financial regulation theory. 
                                                 
12 This was the available history of the Standard and Poors Indexes for Australia.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Overall, the results of this paper are consistent with the conclusions that the cost of equity 
capital has reduced for both financial and banking sectors in Australia and therefore, sup-
port can be argued in relation to the objective of increasing the global competitiveness of 
these sectors in Australia. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Technical Details Supporting the Methodology Designed to Measure Shifts in Systemic 
Risk:   
In this appendix we provide the technical details of our methodology which is designed to 
measure shifts in systemic risk without imposing distributional assumptions upon the return gen-
erating process.  In particular, we estimate the implied risk neutralized distribution from the 
realized path of prices changes over an interval of time both immediately before and after 
the event in question.  Under the assumption of weak form of market efficiency (i.e., arbi-
trage free) the risk neutral distribution exists and preserves information about the higher 
moments of a return distribution that is useful for modern risk management systems.  To 
avoid distributional assumptions, an expected utility approach to recover the risk neutral 
probabilities directly from the implied set of state prices constructed from log-optimal re-
turns (e.g., Luenberger (1998).  There is support in the financial literature for using the 
logarithmic utility function U(w) = Ln(w) (Brown (1987), Kelly (1956), Latane (1959), Lu-
enberger (1998)) as a way of capturing some important basic properties of observed inves-
tor behavior.  The logarithmic utility function is consistent with maximizing expected long-
term growth rate of wealth when using a single period optimization strategy and is consis-
tent  with  the  utility  function  implied  from  aggregate  market  behavior  (Brown  (1987)).   
This preserves information in the tail of the return distribution. 
 
The log-optimal return R* is defined as the return that is optimal for an expected utility 
maximizing investor with preferences that can be represented by a logarithmic utility func-






E λ = ) ( *                   (3) 
 
Where expectations are defined with respect to the real world (empirical probabilities) and 
di is the payoff from security i, λ is the Lagrange multiplier and Pi is the price of security i. 
 
Now consider the log optimal portfolio that is constructed by allocating $1 to the risky as-
set and the risk free asset.  That is, suppose some proportion α is allocated to the risky as-ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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set and 1-α to the risk free security.  Alpha is chosen to maximize expected utility given a 
logarithmic utility function
13.  We will refer to this portfolio as a log optimal portfolio and 
let its expected return be R*.  In addition, because the above necessary condition holds for 
every security i, it is also valid for this log-optimal portfolio itself and therefore the Lagran-
gian multiplier must equal 1 because the price is 1.  This implies that the simple log-optimal 
pricing equation satisfied by the price P, of any security (or portfolio) with dividend d, in 
this logarithmic utility world satisfies the following simple pricing relationship: 
) ( * R
d
E P=                   (4) 
 
Our goal, however, is to recover the risk neutral pricing relationship from this log optimal 
pricing relationship.  We do this by constructing and normalizing the state prices implied 
from the logarithmic utility function.  States are defined in terms of returns and positive 
state prices exist under our assumption that prices are arbitrage free. The state prices are 





x U p ) ( * '
= Ψ                 (5) 
 
In the above equation s is the state, p is the empirical (real world) probability associated 
with the state and x
* the payoff from the optimal portfolio choice problem. For our current 
example, x
* is the payoff from the log optimal portfolio, λ equals 1 and the marginal utility 
equals 1/x
*.  To convert into a (risk neutralized) probability we scale state prices so that 















π                (6) 
 
We then employ Monte Carlo simulation techniques by generating a sequence of return 
realizations from the risk neutral probabilities and hence the return distribution. 
 
We apply the above methodology to a sequence of one year time periods starting at T-1 the 
event date in question (the passing of the Financial Services Bill 2001 through the senate) 
and then observe the subsequent impact at times T, T+1 and T+2 in one year intervals.  
This allowed for the phasing in period explicitly allowed for by the Act.  To capture the 
                                                 
13 On the rare occasion that wealth becomes negative in the log optimal portfolio following Winston (1999) 
we bound utility from below by -100000. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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correlation behavior we apply this directly to both the broader financial sector as well as 
the banking sector in Australia. 
 
Finally when applying the methodology described above we preserve the traditional event 
study controls to look at the impact upon bank sector and investment sector returns con-
trolling for general market movements over time using the All Ordinaries broad based in-
dex as a proxy.  In particular, the log optimal portfolio was constructed to have a zero beta 
weighting on the All Ordinaries whilst retaining sensitivity at the sector level.  In this way 
we distinguish between systematic risk arising from general economy wide drivers and sys-
temic risk which is industry or sector specific risk
14. 
 
                                                 
14 For a review of the early efficient markets papers that examined the significance of industry movements see 
R. Hagin (1979) Ch 6 Modern Portfolio Theory Dow Jones-Irwin. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Appendix B: Companies in the Indices 
S&P/ASX 200 Financials 
Issue Name  Sector Name  Weighting Percentage 
Adelaide Bank Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.003117101 
AMP Ltd Common Stock  Life & Health Insurance  0.034532164 
ANZ Banking Grp Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.111516123 
Aus Wealth Mgmt Common Stock  Asset Management & Custody Banks  0.000789528 
Aust Stock Exch Common Stock  Specialized Finance  0.005983356 
Australand Prop Common Stock  Real Estate Management & Development  0.003532803 
AXA Asia Pacific Common Stock  Life & Health Insurance  0.021763401 
Babcock & Brown Common Stock  Other Diversified Financial Services  0.006597583 
Bendigo Bank Ltd Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.003601814 
Bk Of Queensland Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.003032941 
Bunnings Whse Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.001561953 
Centro Prop Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.011990982 
CFS Gandel Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.00911297 
Chall Fin Serv Common Stock  Other Diversified Financial Services  0.004606474 
Commonwealth Bk Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.132029897 
Comwlth Prop Off Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.005367157 
DB RREEF Trust Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.010445476 
FKP Prop Grp Common Stock  Real Estate Management & Development  0.001355781 
Galileo Shopping Units  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.001511711 
General Prop Tr Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.0200528 
Henderson Group Depository Receipt  Asset Management & Custody Banks  0.002679881 
ING Industrial Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.004498648 
ING Office Fund Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.003596089 
Insur Aust Group Common Stock  Property & Casualty Insurance  0.026478776 
Investa Prop Grp Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.008173952 
IOOF Hldgs Common Stock  Asset Management & Custody Banks  0.001200707 
Lend Lease Corp Common Stock  Real Estate Management & Development  0.013634837 
Macq CountryWide Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.006068753 
Macq Goodman Grp Units  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.015321492 
Macq ProLogis Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.002465788 
Macquarie Bank Common Stock  Investment Banking & Brokerage  0.032171875 
Macquarie DDR Tr Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.00272461 
Macquarie Office Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.006000124 
Mirvac Group Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.008202524 
Multiplex Grp Common Stock  Construction & Engineering  0.007669793 
Natl Aust Bank Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.136834965 
Oamps Ltd Common Stock  Insurance Brokers  0.001010885 
Perpetual Truste Common Stock  Asset Management & Custody Banks  0.005918327 
Promina Group Common Stock  Property & Casualty Insurance  0.014871007 
QBE Insurance Common Stock  Property & Casualty Insurance  0.031863046 
Record Invest Common Stock  Diversified Capital Markets  0.002555215 
SFE Corporation Common Stock  Specialized Finance  0.003677779 
St George Bank Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.036410724 
Stockland Trust Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.020065033 
Suncorp Metway Common Stock  Other Diversified Financial Services  0.029292991 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance DP2005-12 
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Sunland Group Common Stock  Real Estate Management & Development  0.000936619 
Thakral Holdings Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.001286347 
Tishman Speyer Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.001496949 
Tower Common Stock  Multi-line Insurance  0.001831145 
Valad Property Common Stock  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.001449378 
Westfield Group Units  Real Estate Investment Trusts  0.078894053 
Westpac Banking Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.098215674 
 
S&P/ASX Banks 
Issue Name  Sector Name  Weighting Percentage 
Adelaide Bank Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.005940059 
ANZ Banking Grp Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.212509118 
Bendigo Bank Ltd Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.006863746 
Bk Of Queensland Common Stock  Regional Banks  0.005779681 
Commonwealth Bk Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.251600901 
Natl Aust Bank Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.260757609 
St George Bank Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.069385579 
Westpac Banking Common Stock  Diversified Banks  0.187163306 
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